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Abstract
The diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) payment system was established in the 1960s.
Details of DRG-based payment system vary by country. The Diagnosis-Related Group
payments system in Taiwan (Tw-DRG) was established in 2009 in order to contain medical
costs and enhance medical efficiency under a universal coverage, single-payment insurance
system: National Health Insurance (NHI). This capstone reviews the study literature about the
history of DRGs payment system establishment, processes of medical reform, as well as the
implementation and outcomes of Tw-DRGS. According to the studies reviewed there were
changes of medical behaviors after the implementation of Tw-DRGs which included an
increase of medical efficiency and an slightly declining intensity of care which are indicated
by the number of order for medication, diagnosis and treatment during hospitalization. No
significant change was found in patient health outcomes. The financial impacts on different
levels of hospitals, departments or specific clinical items varied. Generally, the profitability
was negatively impacted. Another potential problem noted concerns the disease severity and
explanatory power of Tw-DRGs. Higher illness severity was related to more medical resource
utilization. Due to the lower explanatory power of Tw-DRGs, there exists a lack of
accounting for illness severity could lead to cost shifting or patient dumping.
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Introduction
The Diagnosis-Related Group payments system in Taiwan (Tw-DRG) was established in
2009, with the intention of cost containment and enhancement of medical efficiency within a
single-payment, universal coverage insurance system. The purpose of this capstone is to
review existing literature in order to establish the outcomes of implement ting the Tw-DRG.
The organization is as follows: first, a literature review details the history of DRGs
payment system establishment in the U.S. and other countries. The second section details the
processes of medical reform and implementation of DRGs in Taiwan. The third section
discusses the outcomes of Tw-DRGs implementation by reviewing recent studies in Taiwan
and compares the results to studies of DRGs-based payment system in other countries.
There are many differences between DRG-based payments according to country.
Taiwan has a national health insurance system (NHI) that is a single payer system. Learning
about the outcomes of DRGs implementation in Taiwan could influence future healthcare
reform in the United States and other countries.
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Background Information
Establishment and implementation of DRGs in the United States
Robert B. Fetter, PhD of the School of Management, and John D. Thompson, MPH of
the School of Public Health, first established the diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) payment
system in the1960s at Yale University. DRGs were established: (1) to control the rising cost
of the Medicare program; (2) to bolster hospital management; (3) to improve work efficiency;
(4) to reduce unnecessary length of stay (LOS); (5) to promote usage efficiency of medical
resources (manpower and equipment) cost. These changes would ideally put an emphasis on
physicians’ team work in order to prevent unnecessary tests and services, increase health care
efficiency, avoiding excessive treatment behavior, premised on maintaining quality of
medical services (Chang, 1984).
Fetter and Thompson used AUTOGRP computer programs to analyze patient
information from 18 Connecticut hospitals. Collecting data from approximately 500,000
cases, the team then grouped diagnoses of similar patients, based on statistical analyses of
clinical conditions and decisions made by doctors. This was the first step in forming the
major diagnostic categories (MDCs) which were to collapse the numbers of diagnostic codes
into meaningful, but broad, sub-groups, with 83 MDCs in the original DRGs version. Then,
they analyzed the diagnostic group data on factors such as meaningfulness of diagnostic
decisions making, medical spending homogeneity and variability. They also took into
9
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consideration factors such as LOS, age, sex, surgical situation, treatment complications, et al.
Adjusting for analyzing through these factors, Fetter and Thompson’s classification system of
Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs) emerged as patient classification system to relate types of
cases with costs incurred by medical facilities.
U.S. Medical costs skyrocketed in the 1980s, states and the medical industry were eager
to devise new payment methods for effectively controlling runaway growth (Cheng, et al.,
2012; W. C. Hsiao, et al., 1986). During the same period New Jersey replaced the Standard
Hospital Accounting and Rate Evaluation (SHARE) system with a DRG-based prospective
all-payer system for inpatient reimbursement (W C Hsiao, et al., 1986; May, 1984). Hospitals
were phased into this system over three years. Prices were fixed in advance for services based
on diagnosis and historic average treatment costs for patients discharged within this system.
Actual medical resource costs were not factored in to the equation. The popularity of DRGs
grew rapidly for two reasons: first, state officials wanted to switch reimbursement from per
diem to case-mix-based payment approach. Second, the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) supported state-managed payment experiments to explore
administrative feasibility of implementing diagnosis-related predetermined reimbursement
(W.C. Hsiao, et al., 1986).
DRGs payment system proved useful as a convenient cost management tool in order to
manage economical growth throughout diagnosis and to utilize a clinical situation
10
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classification system. The public expected the medical and healthcare payment industry to
control rising medical costs. In order to address this concern, the federal government made
reference to the New Jersey DRG system implementation experience and formally
implemented DRGs into Medicare in 1983 (Stern & Epsterin,1985).
The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) established Diagnosis-Related
Groups in the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services CMS-DRGs as the new Medicare
Prospective Payment System (PPS). All medical facilities participating in Medicare were
covered by the CMS-DRGs with the exception of rehabilitation, psychiatric care, children’s
hospitals, long term care facilities, and substance abuse treatment units (Yan, 2011). However,
there were controversies about the CMS-DRGs. First, CMS-DRGs failed to reflect the
disease severity and medical resource utilization situation (Freeman et al, 1995；Averill et al,
1998). Second, the first version of CMS-DRGs was designed mainly for the aged and
disabled populations rather than comprehensive coverage of all populations. There were
difficulties implementing CMS-DRGs payment system in specific populations: e.g.,
newborns, substance abuse patients, or those suffering from AIDS (Yan, 2011).
Variant DRGs were designed by diverse organizations: Refined-DRGs (R-DRGs) by
Yale University in 1985, All Patient DRGs (AP-DRGs) with cooperation of the New York

State Department of Health and 3M Health Information System in 1987, the All-Patient
Refined (APR) DRGs by the New Jersey State government in 1988, International Refined
11
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DRGs (IR-DRGs) by 3M Health Information in 2001, and Medicare Severity-Adjusted DRG
(MS-DRGs) by the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Service (CMS) in 2007 (Healthcare
Financial Management, 2008). Currently, Medicare utilizes the MS-DRGs version. It was
designed to improve the impact of disease severity on the medical resource utilization by
adding 207 new DRG coding items and re-dividing each DRG into three different grades of
disease severity: with major complication/comorbidity (MCC), with
complication/comorbidity (CC) and without either (MCC/CC) (Sipkoff, 2008).
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DRGs implementation worldwide
Following the United States’ example, many countries launched their own DRG-based
medical payment systems. France modified the original version of DRGs to develop Groups
Homogenes de Malades 1 (GHM1) which was implemented in 1986. In 1992, Australia
implemented the Australian National DRGs (AN DRGs) based on their healthcare system.
Other European countries like Hungary (1993), Italy (1995), Spain (1997), Denmark (2002),
Germany (2003) and England (2003) implemented modified DRGs based payment system
(Tseng, 2002). South Korea was the first country in Asia to use DRGs-based payment system
to curb rising medical expenditures. Since 1997, Korean health institutions implemented 25
DRGs from selected groups of diseases or medical procedures such as caesarean section,
appendectomy and tonsillectomy (Kwon, 2003). In 1998, Japan faced a rapidly aging
population and a stagnant economy, in order to address the rising medical costs the Japanese
government shifted conventional fee-for-service payment system into a modified case
classification with 2,552 groups, the Diagnosis Procedure Combination (DPC) (Shinichi, et
al., 2005). To date, over 20 countries have implemented DRG-based payment system in
modified form around the world (Bureau of National Health Insurance, 2013; Shinichi, et al.,
2005; Kwon, 2003).
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Table 1 DRG version around the world
COURTRY

DRG VERSION

Australia

AR-DRG

Austria

Leistungsbezogene Diagnosis-Fallgruppen(LDF)

Belgium

APR-DRG

Bulgaria

AP-DRG

Canada

CMG

Czech Republic

IR DRG

Denmark

DK-DRG & DAGs

Finland

Nord-DRG

France

GHM, EfP

Germany

G-DRG(AR-DRG)

United Kingdom

HRG

Greece

HCFA-DRG

Hungary

HDG

Iceland

DRG-O & Nord-DRG

Ireland

AR-DRG

Italy

APR-DRG

Japan

DPC

Netherlands

DBC

Norway

Nord-DRG

Poland

Catalogue of Health care products

Portugal

HCFA-DRG

Romania

HCFA-DRG, IR-DRG

Spain

HCFA-DRG

Sweden

Nord-DRG

U.S.

MS DRG

Sources: Forgione et al., 2004; Han, 2010
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DRGs payment system in Taiwan
Medical reform and establishment of National Health Insurance
In April 1995 the government inaugurated the National Health Insurance (NHI) program
to provide universal basic health services, and improve accessibility to medical care for all
citizens. Everyone, excluding convicts, is obligated to pay premiums to the Bureau of
National Health Insurance (BNHI) and obtain medical resources with comprehensive uniform
benefits package from NHI, a single-payer social insurance program administered by the
government.
Figure 1. National Health Insurance system in Taiwan
Premium from:
Individuals
Employers
government
+ Others

Bureau of NHI

Global Budget
Single payer
DRGs based payment

Premiums

Out of pocket cost
Providers

Insured
Services
All citizens are obligated
Adapted from Bureau of National Health Insurance 2013

Figure 1 shows BNHI collecting premiums from the insured population. According to
original NHI programs, premiums are calculated based on an insured person’s regular salary
15
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(Bureau of National Health Insurance, 2013). There is no compulsory referral gatekeeper
mechanism. Insured people seek medical service with nearly complete freedom of choice
(Bureau of National Health Insurance, 2013; Cheng et al., 2012). BNHI also pays fees to
health care facilities based on fee-for-service plans according to ‘resource-based points of
value’ (Chang, 2013). Periodically, the BHNI and medical service providers negotiate the
value of each point in the local environment with consideration of local difference. Still, due
to extending of coverage, elevating prices, new technology and aging population, revenues of
NHI have lagged behind expenses since 1997, the third year after NHI has been launched
(Lin, et al, 2006; Tseng, 2012).
By 2009, it was estimated that over 90% of all health care facilities, including medical
centers, local hospitals and clinics (the majority of medical treatment, procedures, and even
certain preventive services) were covered by NHI (Cheng et al., 2012). To control escalating
medical costs, which had become a heavy financial burden on the government, the BNHI
introduced strategies like case-payment scheme (Cheng et al., 2012); a Pharmaceutical
Benefit Scheme (PBS) (Chang, 2013; Chi-Liang et al., 2008); a copayment increase (Cheng
et al., 2012) and global budget program (Cheng et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2007). The global
budget program was achieved by reducing unnecessary treatment caused by traditional
fee-for-service programs.
However, one study demonstrated that over 90% medical facilities increased care
16
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intensity as a way to enhance revenues under the global budget program of NHI (Cheng,
2009). By 2010, the overall national financial shortfall of NHI had reached NT$101.5 billion.
If nothing changed, it was expected there would be a financial gap of NT$222.2 billion in
2012. These financial gaps led BNHI to decide to implement DRGs payment system in the
NHI program comprehensively (Bureau of National Health Insurance, 2012).
Implementing Tw-DRGs payment system
Since the NHI began in 1995, BNHI implemented a special case-payment scheme,
which reimbursed fixed amount predetermined money for every surgical procedure
performed in-patient: e.g., Caesarean Section, Appendectomy. Coverage under this scheme
had been expanded yearly to cover forty-nine hospitalized and four out-patient services
(Inguinal Herniorrhaphy, Disposal of Pneumonia and Pleurisy, Disposal of Anal Fistula, and
Adnexal Surgery) in 2009 (Tseng, 2012). This could be seen as a prototype of later NHI
payment change, but it drew criticism due to a lack of adjustment mechanism for a patient’s
age, sex, and complication/comorbidity (Cheng et al., 2012). From 1998-2002, BNHI
gradually promoted a macro-control medical cost policy in dental reimbursement with several
orientations: global budget payment system, case-payment, and pay-for-performance (Tseng,
2012).
The idea of devising a Taiwanese version of Diagnosis Related Groups (Tw-DRGs) had
been discussed since 2000 (Bureau of National Health Insurance, 2013). BNHI used the 18th
17
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version of the U.S. DRG as foundation, provided by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (Former Health Care Financing Administration) and negotiated with various medical
experts to design a classification framework reflecting local health care needs (Tseng, 2012).

Figure 2 Tw-DRGs Schematic classifications for In-patient cases

In-patient cases in

MDCs
(Major Diagnostic

Tw-DRGs
Diagnosis
C/C
Procedure
Outcome
Sex
Age

Categories)

DRG1
DRG2
DRG3
|
DRGn

Classified as organ
or physiological
systems
25MDC+Pre-MDC

n=1017 in 2014

Source: Bureau of National Health Insurance, 2013

As figure 2 shows, each case is categorized based on principal diagnosis, primary
medical procedure, complications, gender, age, and health outcome upon patient discharge
under Tw-DRG program. Medical facilities get roughly the same predetermined
reimbursement point value. BNHI used International Classification of Disease, Ninth
Revision Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) and Major Diagnostic Categories (MDC) as
diagnosis coding.
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Table 2 shows the MDC schematic classifications for in-patient cases.
Table 2. Major Diagnostic Categories (MDC) in Tw-DRG
MDC

Diseases and disorders of the nervous system

MDC2

Diseases and disorders of the eye

MDC3

Diseases and disorders of the ear, nose, mouth and throat

MDC4

Diseases and disorders of the respiratory system

MDC5

Diseases and disorders of the circulatory system

MDC6

Diseases and disorders of the digestive system

MDC7

Diseases and disorders of the hepatobiliary system and pancreas

MDC8

Diseases and disorders of the musculoskeletal system and the connective tissue

MDC9

Diseases and disorders of the skin, subcutaneous tissue and breast

MDC10

Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases and disorders

MDC11

Diseases and disorders of the kidney and urinary tract

MDC12

Diseases and disorders of the male reproductive system

MDC13

Diseases and disorders of the female reproductive system

MDC14

Pregnancy and the childbirth

MDC15

Newborns and other neonates with conditions originating in the perinatal period

MDC16

Diseases and disorders of the blood and blood forming organs and immunological
disorders

MDC17

Myeloproliferative diseases and disorders, and poorly differentiated neoplasms

MDC18

Infectious and parasitic diseases

MDC19

Excluded from Tw-DRG

MDC20

Excluded from Tw-DRG

MDC21

Injuries, poisonings and toxic effects of drugs

MDC22

Burns

MDC23

Factors influencing health status and other contracts with health

MDC24

Multiple significant trauma

Pre-MDC

Heart Transplant
Liver Transplant
Bone Marrow Transplant
Tracheostomy
Lung Transplant
Pancreatic Transplant

Source: Bureau of National Health Insurance, 2014

Figure 3 Example of Tw-DRGs payment classification system
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Adapted from Bureau of National Health Insurance, 2013

BNHI believe this system gives medical facilities greater incentive to raise health care
service efficiency, reduce medical resource expenditure and equalize medical resource
distribution (Bureau of National Health Insurance, 2013). At a practical level, BNHI updated
the fee-charging standards for requesting data from the Insurer of National Health Insurance,
and standard of filing fees for The National Health Insurance Certificate. Beginning in
January 2010, BNHI gradually and comprehensively implemented Tw-DRGs, with a total of
1,029 diagnosis-related groups phased in over five years (Bureau of National Health
Insurance, 2013). Table 3 lists the situations that were uncovered by Tw-DRGs.
20
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Table 3. Situation uncovered by Tw-DRGs
DISEASE

DIAGNOSIS CODES

Case of malignant tumors as principal

140.XX-176.XX, 179.XX-208.XX, V58.0,

diagnosis

V58.1, V67.1, V67.2

Psychiatric case

MDC19, MDC20

Case with diagnosis of AIDS

042

Case of coagulation disorders

286.0-286.3, 286.7

Other rare disease that has been announced
by BNHI
Case in clinical pilot project or study
Case of hospitalization exceeding 30 day
Source: Bureau of National Health Insurance, 2011
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Outcome of DRG Implementation in Taiwan
Changes of Medical Behaviors and Health Outcome
Earlier studies evaluating how DRGs payment system affects intensity of care proved
less inconclusive in other countries. Some studies suggested the DRGs payment system
reduced the care intensity of medical service providers (Palmer, 1989; Long, 1987). However,
another study showed no significant change in this regard (Cutler 1995). Reducing intensity
of care and LOS could adversely affect patient outcome. One study found mortality slightly
higher after introducing DRGs (Culter, 1995). Another suggested no significant link (Kahn, et
al., 1990, Rogers, et al., 1990). The “intensity of care” or the “service intensity” is a concept
to describe the measurement of complexity, amount, content, or attendant risk of medical
services provided. There is variety of indication about the intensity of care, for example: the
numbers of order for medication, number for orders for treatment or diagnosis, number of
orders for special materials or devices, or the number of inpatient physician visits. (Cheng, et
al., 2012, John et al., 2009)
In Taiwan, one nationwide population-based study selected patients who underwent
coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) or percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty
(CTCA) in 2009-2010. The goal was to study the NHI claim database to find out if medical
behaviors and health outcome changed after the implementation of Tw-DRGs for diagnosis
listed in the cardiovascular surgical DRG category (Major Diagnosis Classification [MDC] 5,
Disease and Disorders of the Circulatory system). In this study, cases with CABG or CTCA
22
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procedures incorporated in the Tw-DRG during or after 2010 were considered as the
intervention group (10,824 subjects in the pre-DRG period and 10,824 subjects in the
post-DRG period) and cases with the similar procedures which are paid by fee-for-service
schemes were considered as comparison group (included 28,415 subjects in each of the preand post-DRG periods). They used LOS, numbers of medical orders as proxy for intensity of
care, the likelihood of ER visits within three days after discharge, the mortality rate with 30
days after discharge, and the 30 days readmission rate as the index for health outcome. The
result showed that there was a 10% decrease of LOS and slightly declining intensity of care
after implementing Tw-DRGs. Additionally, no significant change of health outcome before
or after was found (Cheng, et al., 2012).
Hsiu- Mei Lin studied 514 cases of total knee replacement in a Taiwan medical center
from January 2009 through December 2010 in order to compare the outcome of the
implementation of Tw-DRGs. She used the data of composition of hospitalization fee and
implementation rate of 65% minimum requirement service items as an index of medical
behavior; LOS, health insurance hospitalization medical fee, total hospitalization medical fee
and Orthopedic outpatient fee after discharge as index of medical efficiency. Additionally,
adding the factors of patient safety events, ER visits within 3 days of dismissal, and
re-admission within 14 and 30 days after discharge as index of medical quality. She used
Logistics Regression and Poisson regression to analyze the data after controlling variations
23
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such as patient characteristics, OPD treatment situation, hospitalization medical behavior and
OPP for TKR material. The result showed that there were medical behavior change and an
increase of medical efficiency after the implementation of Tw-DRGs. There was significant
reduction of hospitalization total fee (2.69%), diagnosis fee, rehabilitation fee, treatment fee,
drug and pharmaceutical service fee. The reduction of the medicine fee was related to the
decrease in usage of antibiotics and an increase usage of local anesthesia compared with the
pre-TW-DRGs situation. OPD fee was increase after the patient discharge (1.43%). The rate
of LOS in less than 7 days increased (OR-2.44), whereas the hospitalization medical fee
reduced 1.023%, and the total hospitalization medical fee (including OPP) reduced by 2.69%.
There was no significant change of hospitalization patient safety events, or patients with
complications and comorbidity rate within the 30 days data after discharging (Lin, 2011).
Kuei-Miao Kuo analyzed a similar issue. She used data regarding patients who received
CABG surgery before the implementation of Tw-DRGs in 2009 (n=109) or after the
implementation in 2010 (n=86) from a “2005 sampling cohort database of 1,000,000
insured’s” National Health Insurance Research Database (NHIRD). The results show there
are low levels and insignificant drops of LOS and medical expense after TW-DRG. The cost
shifting phenomena was not detected, and medical care quality did not change after
implementing the TW-DRGs system. However, the researcher herself claimed that one of the
major limitations of this research is the less than representative database “2005 sampling
24
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cohort database of 1,000,000 insured’s” (Kao, 2012). There were more than 6,000 cases per
year of CABG in Taiwan (Bureau of National Health Insurance, 2010).
This behavioral change by medical service personnel could be explained by economic
theory. Cutler claims that medical services tend to reduce resource utilization when faced
with zero marginal revenue to yield more benefit.
Financial Impact
Financial influence of DRGs-based payment system proves complex. Chun-Jen Ting
used relational database technology and decision trees to analyze the National Health
Insurance database from 2000 to 2009, and simulate the impact of implementation of the
Tw-DRGs on the pediatric surgery department income. The results showed that after
implementation of the Tw-DRGs system, the income of pediatric surgery inpatient
department will reduce by NTD$ 90,498,202 (5.3%). According to the analysis, there were
only four diseases: hernia (2.4%), appendicitis (4.3%), pyloric obstruction (4.5%) and
intussusception (22.8%) that would have increased earnings. Nine congenital malformation
diseases reduced profit after the implementation of Tw-DRGs, and four diseases reduced by
more than 30%, such as hypospadias (37.7%), bile duct cysts (30.8%), intestinal atresia and
stenosis (30.1%) and biliary atresia (30.0%) (Tin, 2010).
Another study shows there was the financial impact varied by hospital. Even in the same
hospital, departments feel dissimilar influence: e.g., those associated with acute and serious
25

Reviewing the Implementation and Outcome of the Taiwan Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) Payments System

disease had more negative financial impact after implementation (Hsueh, 2006). Wei-Ren
Long’s research, which focused on a regional hospital, shows that implementation of DRGs
increased the amount of medical benefits while decreasing length of hospitalization and
examination fee. Long also compared financial situations between departments. Orthopedics
saw examination and radiation fees drop by remarkable amounts, surgical benefits got
appreciably higher. In Cardiology, radiation examination fees dipped sharply; while
Obstetrics & Gynecology recorded no significant changes (Long, 2011). Shu-chiao Chien
used the hospital management of 2009, data collected from S non-profit hospital located in
Southern Taiwan to simulate analysis of the financial change before and after the
implementation of TW-DRGs. The result showed the profitability of his philanthropic
hospital decreased 0.44%. The profit margin decreased 0.49%, operating margin in medical
treatment segment decreased 0.03% and the return on net assets (RONA) decreased 0.51%.
Even after reactive policy changes such as improving diagnosis coding, standardizing
treatment disposals, improving hospitalization management, and substituting medicine or
special materials were implemented. These changes were considered as ways to increase the
beneficial effects (Chien, 2010).
Disease Severity and Explanatory power
As previously described, Tw-DRGs system was originally based on CMS-DRGs V18.0.
Horn et al. discussed how the most controversial issue of CMS-DRGs is inaccurate reflection
26
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of illness severity (Horn et al, 1985). CMS-DRGs’ lower explanatory power was due to a lack
of accounting for illness severity, which is associated with resource cost to medical service
providers (Tseng et al., 2006; Rossnagel et al., 2005; Yoneda et al., 2005).
One cross-sectional study in Taiwan probes illness severity’s effect on study population
with a diagnosis of cerebrovascular disorders under the Tw-DRGs payment system. The
research used patient medical records and data collected form the National Health Insurance
Research Original Claim Data in 2007: Inpatient expenditures by admissions (NO. SN9602)
and Registry for contracted medical facilities (NO. AN9601). The dependent variables are
defined as medical expenditure and LOS, and the independent variable is the illness severity
(with or with complication/comorbidity). The diagnostic groups (DRG 014), gender and the
age are control variables. There are two main results in this study. First, higher illness
severity means more medical resource utilization of DRG 014. Second, the study shows
explanatory power of medical expenditure in MS-DRGs higher than that in Tw-DRGs under
similar clinical situation. Explanatory power is measured by coefficient of determination (R2)
of medical expenditures and LOS between each DRGs version. The explanatory power of the
medical expenditure in MS-DRGs is 17.02%, which is higher than that in Tw-DRGs
(10.68%). The explanatory power of MS-DRGs about LOS is 7.71%, which is also higher
than those in Tw-DRGs (5.10%). Table 4 shows the difference between CMS-DRGs and
MS-DRGs. (Yan, 2011)
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Table 4. Comparison between CMS-DRGs and MS-DRGs
CMS-DRG

MS-DRG

Adaptive Object

Medicare

Medicare

Developers

Health Care Financing
Administration

Health Care Financing
Administration

Development Time

Since 1983

Since 2007

Reference Version

Nil

CMS-DRGs

DRGs quantity

526

745

Complication/comorbidity

Two levels classification

Three levels classification

With CC
Without CC

without CC/MCC
with CC
With MCC

Source: Han, 2010; Wynn (2008); Quinn (2008); Healthcare Financial Management (2008)
If the DRGs-based payment system fails to reflect medical resource utilization
accurately, negative effects can ensue: e.g., cost shifting (Feldstein, 1999; Menke, 1990),
DRG Creep (O’Malley et al., 2005), and patient dumping (Rose, 1989).
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Conclusion and Suggestions
This capstone has reviewed the development and the major evolution of DRGs-based
payment system, the establishment of Tw-DRGs in Taiwan, and recent studies. Taiwan has a
single-payer health care system. All people participate in NHI by paying premiums to the
Bureau of National Health Insurance and obtain medical resources with comprehensive and
uniform benefits package.
According to the studies collected therein, scientific evidence shows that there were
changes of medical behaviors such as slightly declining intensity of care, and an increase of
medical efficiency after the implementation of Tw-DRGs. No significant patients’ health
outcome change was found. Implementation of Tw-DRGs exerted variant financial impact on
different hospitals and departments. However, the profitability was negatively impacted
among the study hospitals. Departments associated with acute and serious disease felt worse
financial impact after implementation. The disease severity and explanatory power of
Tw-DRGs could be another potential problem. Higher illness severity is related to more
medical resource utilization, but the lower explanatory power of Tw-DRGs because of lack of
accounting for illness severity could have negative effects such as cost shifting or patient
dumping.
For hospital or healthcare providers, some ideas that could have positive effects include
improving diagnosis coding, standardizing treatment disposals, or improving hospitalization
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management to maintain the profitability and medical quality at the same time. Adequately
increasing the medical efficiency is the key. On the other hand, BNHI should consider
modifying Tw-DRGs by increasing explanatory power to augment financial efficiency, in
order to fit the disease severity. Additionally, taking into account other factors that could
affect the medical financing system such as culture, medical worker quantity and quality is
vital. Although published research does not document the DRG creeps phenomenon
(deliberately up-coding methods to enhance reimbursement). This phenomenon is still
discussed widely by multimedia, forums and conferences. It is suggested that future studies
should focus on the result of this phenomenon.
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